wow-digest
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted text content from external newsletters and Telegram posts and interpolates it into a prompt for scoring and summarization.
- Ingestion points: Content is pulled from Gmail and Telegram in
scripts/ingest.py. - Boundary markers: The
config/wow_prompt.txttemplate uses weak delimiters (e.g.,### Candidate 1) but does not include explicit instructions for the model to ignore potential commands embedded in the content. - Capability inventory: The results are used to update the user's daily markdown notes and the skill invokes shell commands via
subprocess.runto interact with thellmCLI. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering for injection tokens is performed on the ingested snippets before they are placed in the prompt.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: To personalize the digest, the skill reads sensitive user data from
~/Brains/brain/, including the user's focus document, recent research notes, and daily note headers. This data is transmitted to an external LLM provider via thellmCLI. This behavior is documented as a primary feature of the skill. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on
subprocess.runinscripts/ingest.pyandscripts/wow_score.pyto call external binaries includinggws,llm, and a localtg.pyscript. While the arguments are passed as a list to minimize shell injection risk, the skill depends on the security and availability of these external tools. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]:
scripts/enrich.pyextracts URLs from ingested content and sends them to the Firecrawl API (api.firecrawl.dev) for scraping. This process involves transmitting potentially sensitive URLs from private feeds to a third-party service.
Audit Metadata