flow-next-ralph-init
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill configures the
ralph.shharness to run theclaudeCLI with the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag (via theYOLO=1setting inconfig.env). This allows the autonomous agent to execute shell commands and perform file operations without user oversight or confirmation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: During initialization, the skill uses
chmod +xto grant execution permissions to several scripts and binaries (ralph.sh,ralph_once.sh,flowctl,ralph-guard.py) it creates in thescripts/ralph/directory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The harness exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by retrieving data from the local repository and interpolating it into prompts used to drive the agent's actions.
- Ingestion points: Data from
git status,git log, andflowctl show(referenced intemplates/prompt_plan.md,prompt_work.md, andprompt_completion.md) is incorporated into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The prompts lack delimiters or specific instructions to the agent to disregard instructions that might be embedded within the repository data.
- Capability inventory: The autonomous agent has access to all standard tools, including shell execution (
bash) and file system access, with high risk due to the disabled permissions checks. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the data retrieved from the repository before it is placed into the prompts.
Audit Metadata