competitor-content-tracker
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides explicit instructions for establishing persistence on the host system using a cron job (
0 8 * * 1 python3 run_skill.py ...) to automate weekly execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Shell commands are constructed by interpolating variables directly into command strings (e.g.,
python3 ... --urls "<competitor_blog_url>"). This pattern creates a risk of command injection if the input values, such as URLs or search keywords, contain shell metacharacters. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from external websites.
- Ingestion points: Scraped content from competitor blogs, LinkedIn posts, and Twitter/X feeds obtained via the
blog-scraper,linkedin-profile-post-scraper, andtwitter-scraperskills. - Boundary markers: The prompt logic does not define clear boundaries or delimiters for the external content, nor does it include instructions for the agent to ignore directives found within the scraped data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes subprocess execution via
python3and performs file system writes toclients/<client-name>/intelligence/. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the ingested external content before it is analyzed and synthesized into reports.
Audit Metadata