performance-optimization

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the SN-Execute-Background-Script tool across multiple phases (Steps 1.2, 3.4, 4.1, 9.1). This tool allows for the execution of arbitrary server-side JavaScript on the target ServiceNow instance, providing a powerful and potentially dangerous execution environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requests the Bash native tool in its frontmatter, which grants the agent access to a local shell environment.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The use of background scripts to analyze system behavior effectively constitutes remote code execution on the ServiceNow platform, as logic is passed dynamically to the instance's execution engine.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs extensive queries on sensitive system tables including syslog, syslog_transaction, and sys_slow_transaction. While the provided scripts use gs.info() for local reporting, these tools can be used to extract sensitive transaction details, user metadata, and internal system configurations.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested from sys_slow_transaction, syslog_transaction, and syslog tables in SKILL.md (Steps 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 4.1).
  • Boundary markers: None; the transaction URLs and log messages are processed as raw strings within the JavaScript templates.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to SN-Execute-Background-Script (RCE), SN-Create-Record, and SN-Query-Table tools.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is performed on the log data before it is processed or printed, which could lead to malicious log content influencing agent behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 29, 2026, 04:36 PM