performance-optimization
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
SN-Execute-Background-Scripttool across multiple phases (Steps 1.2, 3.4, 4.1, 9.1). This tool allows for the execution of arbitrary server-side JavaScript on the target ServiceNow instance, providing a powerful and potentially dangerous execution environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requests the
Bashnative tool in its frontmatter, which grants the agent access to a local shell environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The use of background scripts to analyze system behavior effectively constitutes remote code execution on the ServiceNow platform, as logic is passed dynamically to the instance's execution engine.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs extensive queries on sensitive system tables including
syslog,syslog_transaction, andsys_slow_transaction. While the provided scripts usegs.info()for local reporting, these tools can be used to extract sensitive transaction details, user metadata, and internal system configurations. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from
sys_slow_transaction,syslog_transaction, andsyslogtables in SKILL.md (Steps 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 4.1). - Boundary markers: None; the transaction URLs and log messages are processed as raw strings within the JavaScript templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
SN-Execute-Background-Script(RCE),SN-Create-Record, andSN-Query-Tabletools. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping is performed on the log data before it is processed or printed, which could lead to malicious log content influencing agent behavior.
Audit Metadata