Project Scaffolding

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill configures an automated PostToolUse hook in .claude/settings.json that executes a bash script (.claude/scripts/post-edit-check.sh) whenever the agent performs file edits. This creates a persistent execution loop triggered by common agent actions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands (cp and chmod +x) to deploy and enable an executable script within the user's project directory.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions include an indirect prompt injection surface by consuming untrusted data from the project root (e.g., README.md, package.json) to populate the CLAUDE.md system prompt file.
  • Ingestion points: Files like README.md, package.json, and the overall project directory structure are read to extract descriptions and metadata.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions or delimiters in the generated CLAUDE.md to prevent the agent from following instructions that might be embedded in the ingested project data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the file system, create directories, modify agent settings, and execute shell scripts via hooks.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the content read from project files before it is interpolated into the configuration templates.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 3, 2026, 02:11 PM