querying-council-with-agents

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent-prompt-template.md file defines a shell command bash {SCRIPT_PATH} "{QUESTION}" that is executed by a subagent. The {QUESTION} placeholder is populated with user-supplied input or context from local files. Because the input is wrapped in double quotes in a shell environment without escaping, an attacker can use shell metacharacters (e.g., "; <malicious_command>; ") to break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary code.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple sources and processes it using high-privilege shell capabilities, creating a significant indirect prompt injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: User input and file context are ingested via the {QUESTION} placeholder in SKILL.md. External provider responses are ingested and evaluated by the subagent in Round 2 of the process defined in agent-prompt-template.md.
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers, XML tags, or delimiters are used to isolate untrusted content, nor are there instructions to the subagent to disregard instructions within the ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The subagent has the capability to execute shell commands via the bash utility as defined in the prompt template.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping of the user-controlled or provider-supplied data is performed before it is interpolated into shell commands or evaluation prompts.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 11, 2026, 05:24 PM