querying-council-with-agents
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
agent-prompt-template.mdfile defines a shell commandbash {SCRIPT_PATH} "{QUESTION}"that is executed by a subagent. The{QUESTION}placeholder is populated with user-supplied input or context from local files. Because the input is wrapped in double quotes in a shell environment without escaping, an attacker can use shell metacharacters (e.g.,"; <malicious_command>; ") to break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary code. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from multiple sources and processes it using high-privilege shell capabilities, creating a significant indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: User input and file context are ingested via the
{QUESTION}placeholder inSKILL.md. External provider responses are ingested and evaluated by the subagent in Round 2 of the process defined inagent-prompt-template.md. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers, XML tags, or delimiters are used to isolate untrusted content, nor are there instructions to the subagent to disregard instructions within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The subagent has the capability to execute shell commands via the
bashutility as defined in the prompt template. - Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or escaping of the user-controlled or provider-supplied data is performed before it is interpolated into shell commands or evaluation prompts.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata