dev-workflow

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates a secondary skill definition (run-tests/SKILL.md) by parsing local project configuration files such as package.json, Makefile, and docker-compose.yml. This generated content is written to the filesystem and subsequently executed by the agent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: During the initialization process, the skill executes various shell commands to detect project types and set up prerequisites. This includes potentially impactful operations like starting Docker services (docker compose up -d) or preparing databases (bin/rails db:prepare).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface because it derives execution logic and command parameters from untrusted files within the project directory and from previous conversation history.
  • Ingestion points: Local configuration files (package.json, Gemfile, Cargo.toml, etc.) and the current conversation history (used in Step 9).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit delimiters or instruction-ignore headers when processing data from these files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to extensive shell command execution (Bash), file modification (Write, Edit), and the ability to spawn subagents (Agent tool).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the commands extracted from project files before they are executed in the shell.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 22, 2026, 01:38 AM