openclaw-homeassistant
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface because it retrieves and processes data from a Home Assistant instance, such as entity states and attributes. If an attacker can manipulate this data (e.g., by compromising a smart device or modifying a friendly name), they could potentially influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via 11 read-oriented tools in
src/tools.ts, includingha_get_state,ha_list_entities,ha_history, andha_sensor_list. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement specific boundary markers or instructions to differentiate Home Assistant data from the agent's system prompt, leaving the agent susceptible to instructions embedded in the data.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides a significant set of capabilities with 23 write tools, including powerful generic operations like
ha_call_service,ha_fire_event, andha_render_template(src/guards.ts). - Sanitization: While the skill enforces strict regex-based validation for entity IDs, it does not sanitize or escape the content of entity attributes or states (e.g., friendly names) before returning them to the agent.
- [SAFE]: The skill implements a robust safety model including a global
readOnlytoggle that blocks all 23 write-capable tools and anallowedDomainsallowlist that restricts the agent to specific device categories (src/guards.ts). - [SAFE]: The implementation has zero runtime dependencies, significantly reducing the risk of supply chain attacks.
Audit Metadata