openclaw-homeassistant

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface because it retrieves and processes data from a Home Assistant instance, such as entity states and attributes. If an attacker can manipulate this data (e.g., by compromising a smart device or modifying a friendly name), they could potentially influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via 11 read-oriented tools in src/tools.ts, including ha_get_state, ha_list_entities, ha_history, and ha_sensor_list.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement specific boundary markers or instructions to differentiate Home Assistant data from the agent's system prompt, leaving the agent susceptible to instructions embedded in the data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill provides a significant set of capabilities with 23 write tools, including powerful generic operations like ha_call_service, ha_fire_event, and ha_render_template (src/guards.ts).
  • Sanitization: While the skill enforces strict regex-based validation for entity IDs, it does not sanitize or escape the content of entity attributes or states (e.g., friendly names) before returning them to the agent.
  • [SAFE]: The skill implements a robust safety model including a global readOnly toggle that blocks all 23 write-capable tools and an allowedDomains allowlist that restricts the agent to specific device categories (src/guards.ts).
  • [SAFE]: The implementation has zero runtime dependencies, significantly reducing the risk of supply chain attacks.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 30, 2026, 05:37 PM