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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's description in
SKILL.mdcontains an instruction ('ALWAYS activate this skill before implementing EVERY feature, plan, or fix') that attempts to override standard agent behavior by forcing the use of this specific workflow for all development tasks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'Smart Intent Detection' logic in
references/intent-detection.mdrelies on simple keywords such as 'trust me', 'auto', and 'yolo' to activate the autonomous mode. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where external or untrusted data containing these keywords could trick the agent into performing complex tasks without human oversight. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The '--auto' mode (detailed in
SKILL.mdandreferences/workflow-steps.md) explicitly skips all human review gates ('blocking gates'). This allows the agent to autonomously generate code, execute tests, and modify files with no manual intervention. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The finalization step in
references/workflow-steps.mdautomatically invokes agit-managersubagent to stage and commit changes. When combined with the--automode, this results in the agent autonomously modifying the repository's version history without user approval of the code changes.
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