fix
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashsubagent to perform development tasks. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdand various workflow files (workflow-quick.md,workflow-standard.md,workflow-deep.md) instruct the agent to run commands for testing (npm test,bun test,pytest), linting (bun run lint), and building (bun run build). - Evidence:
references/workflow-ui.mdexecutes local Python scripts located in other skill directories:python3 .claude/skills/ui-ux-pro-max/scripts/search.py. - Evidence:
references/workflow-ui.mdsuggests usingImageMagickfor image editing. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external registries and GitHub services to fetch code and data.
- Evidence:
references/workflow-ci.mduses the GitHub CLI (gh run view) to fetch remote CI/CD logs. - Evidence:
references/workflow-types.mdand other workflows involve the use of package managers likenpm,bun, andtscwhich typically interact with public registries. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from multiple sources.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads CI/CD logs (
references/workflow-ci.md), application logs fromlogs.txt(references/workflow-logs.md), and external documentation via theresearchersubagent (references/workflow-deep.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or warnings to 'ignore embedded instructions' are provided when log content or research data is ingested into the agent's context.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses high-privilege capabilities including arbitrary shell execution (
Bash), file modification/commits (git-manager), and tool orchestration. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the external content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata