skill-miner
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's primary function is to read and analyze AI agent session logs and transcript files stored in the local file system, exposing potentially sensitive data to the agent.
- Evidence:
references/discovery-rubric.mdlists sensitive paths such as~/.codex/sessions/,~/.claude/projects/, and~/.gemini/. - Evidence:
scripts/scan_sessions.pyspecifically parses these files, which contain the full history of user interactions with various AI models. This history often includes proprietary code, personal information, and potentially hardcoded secrets from past development sessions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a local Python script to perform the data processing and file system scanning.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to runscripts/scan_sessions.py. - Evidence: The script iterates through the file system to locate and read log files across multiple agent platforms.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as an ingestion point for untrusted data by processing logs of past conversations, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Evidence:
scripts/scan_sessions.pyextracts user and assistant messages from logs. If these logs contain malicious payloads from prior (compromised) interactions, they could influence the current agent's analysis or skill-drafting behavior. - Ingestion points:
~/.codex/sessions/**/*.jsonl,~/.claude/projects/**/*.jsonl, etc. - Boundary markers: Absent.
- Capability inventory: The agent can read files and execute the scanning script (
scripts/scan_sessions.py) as instructed inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: A
sanitizefunction inscripts/scan_sessions.pyattempts to redact emails and some API key patterns, but it does not prevent instruction injection.
Audit Metadata