document-writer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/write.pyand the workflow inSKILL.mdperform dynamic module loading by modifyingsys.pathat runtime to include a directory relative to the user's home path (~/.claude/skills/shared-lib). Loading code from computed paths is a potential security risk as it could lead to the execution of unintended modules if the local environment is compromised. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted user-provided text or file content as source material for its writing tasks.
- Ingestion points: Arbitrary themes and source files are read and processed in Step 1 of the
SKILL.mdworkflow and via thescripts/write.pycommand-line arguments. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters or provide specific prompts to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the source content.
- Capability inventory: The skill is configured with access to
Bash,Read,Write, andEdittools, allowing for significant system impact if the agent follows malicious instructions hidden in the input data. - Sanitization: Absent. No filtering, validation, or escaping is applied to the input content before it is processed by the AI.
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