comprehensive-analysis
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from multiple external sources, creating an attack surface where embedded instructions could influence the agent's summary or subsequent actions.
- Ingestion points: Slack message threads, GitHub PR titles/comments, Linear issue descriptions, and local meeting notes referenced in
SKILL.mdPhase 1. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions for subagents do not include specific delimiters or warnings to ignore malicious instructions within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via the
ghCLI, network operations through Slack, Linear, and PostHog MCP tools, and file system write access for saving synthesis reports described inSKILL.mdPhase 2. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill summarizes and cross-references external text without explicit sanitization or validation of the content's safety.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using the GitHub CLI to retrieve repository metrics.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdPhase 1 Agent 1 usesgh pr listandgh apito collect pull request data and contributor statistics.
Audit Metadata