subagent-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from external sources and providing it to subagents as context.
- Ingestion points: Section 1.4.1 retrieves pull request bodies, comments, and referenced issue content via the GitHub CLI.
- Boundary markers: The task prompts do not use specific delimiters or instructions to isolate the untrusted context from the subagent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The orchestration uses
git,ghCLI, andcodex execwhich includes workspace-write permissions for outputting findings. - Sanitization: No evidence of escaping or filtering content retrieved from GitHub before interpolation into prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automates its workflow through several local command-line tools.
- Uses
gitto manage diff generation and branch context. - Uses
gh(GitHub CLI) to fetch metadata and discussion history from pull requests. - Uses
rg(ripgrep) to identify pull request or issue numbers from the workspace directory name. - Uses
codex execto launch parallel subagent tasks in a sandboxed environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves metadata from a well-known service.
- Fetches pull request and issue details (titles, descriptions, comments) from GitHub using the official CLI tool.
Audit Metadata