team-memory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which can contain malicious instructions intended to manipulate the agent's output.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads external data from git logs, pull request bodies, issue trackers (Jira, Linear, GitHub), and conversation transcripts as described in
SKILL.md(Step 3). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or structural markers to isolate external data from its own instructions during the synthesis process.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local file system (
team-memory/MEMORY.md) and execute shell commands to commit changes to the repository (git add,git commit). - Sanitization: The skill includes specific instructions for a "PII and scope filter" in
SKILL.md(Step 0) to remove personal identifiers and sensitive chat content. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads project configuration and conversation history to generate a shared file that is committed to the repository, potentially leading to accidental exposure of sensitive project context.
- The skill reads configuration files from
.claude/directories andCLAUDE.mdfiles (Step 0.5). - The skill aggregates in-session conversation history, which may inadvertently contain sensitive technical details or internal communications, and persists them into a git-tracked file (
team-memory/MEMORY.md). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to discover files and aggregate history.
- Evidence: Uses
findto locate configuration and memory files across the repository (Step 0.5). - Evidence: Uses
git logandgh pr listto gather project activity (Step 3). - Evidence: Uses
git addandgit committo persist the generated memory file (Step 6).
Audit Metadata