import-sop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute a local script
scripts/guidelines-manager.pywith arguments{name}and{content}provided by the user. If the underlying platform executes this via a shell without strict escaping, it may be vulnerable to command injection through maliciously crafted SOP content. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted text from users (process descriptions, workflow steps) and saves it to the local filesystem (
~/.claude-marketing/sops/). This content is intended to be referenced by other modules to guide future agent actions, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if the SOPs contain instructions designed to override agent behavior. - Ingestion points: User-provided SOP content and names processed in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety warnings are instructed for the saved SOP content to prevent it from being interpreted as instructions by the LLM later.
- Capability inventory: File system writing and execution of the
guidelines-manager.pyscript. - Sanitization: The process lacks explicit sanitization or validation steps for the user-supplied content before it is structured and saved.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic context and string interpolation to build command-line calls (e.g.,
guidelines-manager.py --action save-sop --name {name} --content "{content}"). The use of unvalidated, user-controlled variables in execution contexts is a significant security risk.
Audit Metadata