injective-wallet-ops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFEMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: There are inconsistencies between the skill's frontmatter and its accompanying files. The frontmatter identifies the author as 'ck' and the license as 'MIT', whereas the LICENSE file specifies 'Injective Labs' as the copyright holder and the 'Apache 2.0' license. Such discrepancies can mislead users or automated systems regarding the skill's origins and legal terms.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
generate_wallets_from_seedfunction inSKILL.mdexplicitly extracts and returns theprivate_keyof generated wallets in plaintext hex format. While required for wallet derivation tasks, storing or returning raw private keys in the agent's context or conversation history increases the risk of credential exposure if logs are compromised or if the agent inadvertently reveals these values to the user. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection through the processing of untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts a
seed_phrasein thegenerate_wallets_from_seedfunction and arawaddress string in thenormalizefunction. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including transaction signing and broadcasting via
MsgBroadcasterWithPk, and querying account balances through network RPC calls. - Sanitization: While the skill provides regex validation for addresses (
INJ_BECH32,ETH_HEX), it lacks validation or sanitization for theseed_phraseinput.
Audit Metadata