genshijin-compress

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads the contents of local files and transmits them to the Anthropic API or the 'claude' CLI for processing. While this involves data transfer to a third-party service, it is the primary intended function of the token-reduction tool. The skill implements a security filter in scripts/compress.py using the is_sensitive_path function to prevent the accidental upload of sensitive files such as SSH keys, environment configurations, and credential files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/compress.py utilizes subprocess.run to call the external 'claude' CLI tool. The command is constructed with a static list of arguments, which prevents shell command injection. This is used as a fallback if the primary Python API client is not available.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from local files into an LLM prompt.
  • Ingestion points: File content is read via filepath.read_text() in scripts/compress.py and passed to the LLM.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt uses a simple text label without robust delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the source file.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to overwrite local files via filepath.write_text() and execute CLI tools.
  • Sanitization: The skill mitigates risks through a post-processing validation step in scripts/validate.py, which ensures that the compressed output maintains the original file's structure, including headings, URLs, and code blocks, reverting changes if discrepancies are detected.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 11, 2026, 06:00 AM