sre
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill makes extensive use of sensitive file paths located in the user's home directory. Specifically, it references and sets the KUBECONFIG environment variable to files such as
~/.kube/<cluster>.yaml. These files are critical security assets containing authentication tokens, certificates, and endpoint information for Kubernetes cluster access. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documents and scripts several high-privilege operations:
- Container Execution: Uses
kubectl execto run commands likewgetinside monitoring containers to query the Prometheus API locally, bypassing external authentication proxies. - Security Policy Bypass: Provides an 'emergency escape hatch' to disable network security enforcement at the namespace level using
kubectl label namespace <ns> network-policy.homelab/enforcement=disabled. - Tunnelling: Instructs the use of
kubectl port-forwardto establish network tunnels to internal services likehubble-relay. - Credential Piping: Includes instructions for manual artifact promotion that involve piping sensitive environment variables into CLI tools, specifically
echo $GITHUB_TOKEN | docker login. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains strong behavioral directives that attempt to strictly mandate agent reasoning patterns, such as 'You MUST apply 5 Whys before concluding any investigation' and 'Zero Alert Tolerance
- Every firing alert must be addressed immediately'. While intended as SRE methodology, these function as instruction overrides.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core troubleshooting workflows:
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read and analyze untrusted data from pod logs (
kubectl logs) and event streams (kubectl describe), which can be influenced by attackers controlling workloads or network traffic. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions to wrap ingested content in delimiters or to ignore embedded instructions within the processed logs.
- Capability inventory: The agent has extensive capabilities to execute shell commands, modify cluster resources, and perform network operations based on its analysis of this untrusted data.
- Sanitization: The skill lacks mechanisms for sanitizing or validating external content before it is interpolated into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata