distill-to-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
WebSearchandWebFetchto retrieve content from arbitrary external URLs provided by the user or identified during research phases. This content is used as the primary source for skill generation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs the
Agenttool to spawn multiple sub-processes concurrently for data extraction tasks. It also performs file system operations to move generated files from a staging directory to permanent installation paths like~/.claude/skills/or~/.agents/skills/. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the ingestion of untrusted external data (PDFs, articles, and transcripts). A malicious source could contain hidden instructions designed to bypass the skill's template constraints or to embed malicious behavior into the resulting agent skill.
- Ingestion points: Uses the
Readtool for local files (e.g., PDFs, epubs) andWebFetchfor remote URLs. - Boundary markers: Implements strict output templates and citation rules requiring every claim to be grounded in a verifiable source quote.
- Capability inventory: Uses the
Agenttool for sub-task delegation and possesses file-write capabilities to hidden user directories. - Sanitization: While it mandates citation-based grounding, the skill does not explicitly mention sanitization or escaping of the raw source text before it is processed by sub-agents.
Audit Metadata