matchms-spectral-matching
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documents and provides code examples for using
load_from_pickleandsave_as_pickle(Core API Module 1) to handle spectral data. Python'spicklemodule is inherently insecure as it can execute arbitrary code during deserialization. Loading a compromised.picklefile could result in a full system compromise. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process mass spectrometry data from external formats including MGF, MSP, mzML, mzXML, and JSON. Metadata fields within these files (e.g.,
compound_name,smiles,inchi) could be used to embed malicious instructions targeting the AI agent. - Ingestion points: Functions like
load_from_mgf,load_from_mzml,load_from_msp, andload_from_jsondescribed inSKILL.mdand used throughout the examples. - Boundary markers: The documentation does not provide instructions or patterns for the agent to distinguish between valid data and potential instructions embedded in metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes extensive file system I/O capabilities for reading and writing spectral data.
- Sanitization: While metadata cleanup filters like
clean_compound_nameanddefault_filtersare available, they are intended for data normalization rather than security-focused sanitization against prompt injection.
Audit Metadata