external-pattern-integrator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
curlorWebFetchin Step 1.2 to download content from arbitrary URLs provided as arguments to the/tmpdirectory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Phase 2 (Contextual Enhancement) involves extracting instructions from external sources and merging them directly into local
SKILL.mdand agent files. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where untrusted external content can override the local agent's core behavior. - Ingestion points: External URLs or files provided in
$ARGUMENTS(SKILL.md Step 1.2). - Boundary markers: None; the skill merges content into existing files with only simple source attribution comments.
- Capability inventory: File read/write,
curlnetwork operations,uv runcommand execution,git commitoperations (SKILL.md Phases 1-3). - Sanitization: None; the skill reads and integrates the full content of external sources based on pattern similarity.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Step 3.1 executes
uv run prek runon files modified with untrusted external content. If the external source manages to inject code into a script file or exploits the linter, this could lead to unintended local command execution.
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