groom-milestone
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow defined in
SKILL.md(Step 4a) directly executes theclaudecommand-line interface to spawn sub-agent sessions. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs and executes shell commands at runtime by interpolating external GitHub issue titles into the command string:
claude ... 'Load /dh:groom-backlog-item {title}'. This allows untrusted data to influence the execution parameters of the sub-agent. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The parallel sub-agent sessions are invoked using the
--permission-mode autoflag. This configuration allows the sub-agents to execute tools and system operations without human oversight or confirmation, bypassing standard security prompts. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from GitHub and passing it to high-capability sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content is read from GitHub issue titles and descriptions via
backlog_list_issuesandbacklog_viewinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or protective delimiters are used when interpolating the
{title}into the sub-agent's starting instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill spawns processes with automatic tool-use permissions and generates dispatch plans that control future code execution.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of issue titles before they are executed in the sub-agent context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
references/dispatch-plan-schema.mddefines aquality_gatesschema intended to store and execute arbitrary shell commands (e.g.,uv run prek run --all-files). This creates a mechanism where the skill's output persists shell instructions that will be executed by downstream processes.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata