groom-milestone
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
BatchGroomstep inSKILL.mdexecutes a shell command to spawn sub-agents:claude -p --model sonnet --permission-mode auto --output-format json --no-session-persistence 'Load /dh:groom-backlog-item {title}'. The{title}variable is sourced from external GitHub issue titles provided by thebacklog_list_issuestool. This creates a shell command injection vulnerability if a GitHub issue title contains malicious shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks or semicolons). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the processing of external GitHub issue data.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the
backlog_list_issuestool, which retrieves issue titles and descriptions from GitHub (Step 1 and Step 4 inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or explicit instructions to the sub-agent to ignore instructions embedded within the interpolated
{title}. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including executing local shell commands via the
claudeCLI and performing file-write operations through thedispatch_create_planMCP tool. - Sanitization: The skill lacks evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the
{title}content before it is used to construct sub-agent prompts or shell commands.
Audit Metadata