interop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests content from a file path provided via
$ARGUMENTSand extracts raw text fields (Title, Goal, Spec, Chunks) which are subsequently passed as contextual prose to thework-backlog-itemskill. - Ingestion points: The
Readtool is used to ingest the entire content of the file path specified in$ARGUMENTS(SKILL.md, Step 1). - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions when passing the extracted plan content to the downstream skill.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Read,Edit, thework-backlog-itemskill delegation,mcp__plugin_dh_backlog__backlog_add, and subprocess execution viauv run(SKILL.md, Steps 1-7). - Sanitization: There is no sanitization or escaping of the extracted text before it is interpolated into the delegation prompt for
work-backlog-item. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local CLI tool using
uv run "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/sam_schema/cli.py" plan listto resolve plan addresses if they are not found in the delegated skill output. This relies on the environment variableCLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOTand executes a Python script within the agent's environment. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill utilizes the
Readtool on an arbitrary file path provided by the user in$ARGUMENTS. Although the skill includes validation steps to check for specific markdown patterns (#,**Goal:**), a malicious path could result in sensitive file content being ingested into the LLM context if it happens to contain or mimic the expected markers.
Audit Metadata