interop

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests content from a file path provided via $ARGUMENTS and extracts raw text fields (Title, Goal, Spec, Chunks) which are subsequently passed as contextual prose to the work-backlog-item skill.
  • Ingestion points: The Read tool is used to ingest the entire content of the file path specified in $ARGUMENTS (SKILL.md, Step 1).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions when passing the extracted plan content to the downstream skill.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to Read, Edit, the work-backlog-item skill delegation, mcp__plugin_dh_backlog__backlog_add, and subprocess execution via uv run (SKILL.md, Steps 1-7).
  • Sanitization: There is no sanitization or escaping of the extracted text before it is interpolated into the delegation prompt for work-backlog-item.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local CLI tool using uv run "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/sam_schema/cli.py" plan list to resolve plan addresses if they are not found in the delegated skill output. This relies on the environment variable CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT and executes a Python script within the agent's environment.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill utilizes the Read tool on an arbitrary file path provided by the user in $ARGUMENTS. Although the skill includes validation steps to check for specific markdown patterns (#, **Goal:**), a malicious path could result in sensitive file content being ingested into the LLM context if it happens to contain or mimic the expected markers.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 3, 2026, 10:27 AM