orchestrate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-provided task descriptions and passes them as context to specialized sub-agents and backlog management tools, creating a surface where embedded instructions could potentially influence downstream agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: User-supplied task descriptions provided as arguments to the /orchestrate command in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit requirements for using delimiters or boundary markers when delegating tasks to sub-agents like python-cli-architect or spec-analyst.
  • Capability inventory: The skill calls the mcp__plugin_dh_backlog__backlog_add tool and delegates complex workflows to multiple specialized agents across different files.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the user's task description is performed before it is interpolated into delegation contexts or tool arguments.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 3, 2026, 10:28 AM