orchestrate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-provided task descriptions and passes them as context to specialized sub-agents and backlog management tools, creating a surface where embedded instructions could potentially influence downstream agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied task descriptions provided as arguments to the
/orchestratecommand inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit requirements for using delimiters or boundary markers when delegating tasks to sub-agents like
python-cli-architectorspec-analyst. - Capability inventory: The skill calls the
mcp__plugin_dh_backlog__backlog_addtool and delegates complex workflows to multiple specialized agents across different files. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the user's task description is performed before it is interpolated into delegation contexts or tool arguments.
Audit Metadata