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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes local tools and scripts as part of its operational workflow.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdrequiresscripts/preflight.shto be executed as a prerequisite. - Evidence: Step 2 in both the English and Korean skill definitions involves calling a
distillcommand-line utility with arguments derived from user input. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: User input is captured via the
{input}and{audience}variables inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters to encapsulate or isolate the user-provided data from the command structure.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Writetool to create and modify files within thedocs/directory. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization or validation logic for the content provided by the user.
- Mitigation: The risk of malicious automated file operations is significantly reduced by a mandatory human-in-the-loop (HITL) step in Step 4, which requires the user to explicitly confirm any file-saving actions.
Audit Metadata