skills/jeo-tech-ai/oh-my-gods/omx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

omx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation explicitly recommends using the --madmax flag, which it defines as mapping to the Codex CLI --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox flag. This instructs the agent to operate without security constraints or mandatory human approvals.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Installation requires downloading and globally installing an npm package (oh-my-codex) from an external repository and running setup and diagnostic commands that execute third-party code on the host system.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill supports a plugin architecture using lifecycle hooks stored in .omx/hooks/*.mjs. These local files are executed during session events, providing a mechanism for persistent arbitrary code execution within the agent's runtime environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestration layer ingests external data from project files and custom instructions without sanitization or boundary markers, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious code could hijack agent behaviors.
  • Ingestion points: Project-level AGENTS.md file, .omx/hooks/ files, and local files accessed via Grep and Glob tools.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instruction-ignore warnings are identified in the skill logic.
  • Capability inventory: Extensive permissions including Bash execution, file write access, and coordination of up to 30 specialized agents.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of input validation, escaping, or filtering for external content interpolated into prompts.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 20, 2026, 06:59 AM