jfrog-system-config-repo
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface by processing external manifest files.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from a user-provided or external YAML manifest file (referenced as
$MANIFEST_FILE). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or explicit 'ignore' instructions when interpolating manifest data into tool operations.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
jf api(network and JFrog platform access),git(cloning and pushing to remote repositories), andcurl(arbitrary HTTP requests), along with file system operations (mkdir,cp,rm). - Sanitization: Absent. Values extracted via
yq(such asSTATE_PROJECT,STATE_REPO, andSTATE_GIT_REPO) are used directly in shell command strings without validation or escaping. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates shell variables extracted from the manifest directly into bash commands. This pattern allows for command injection if a manifest file contains malicious characters (e.g.,
;,&&, or backticks). Examples include construction of URLs forgitoperations and path parameters forjf apicalls. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits the
JFROG_ACCESS_TOKENvia headers to endpoints. Since theGITHUB_HOSTand repository paths are configurable via the manifest file, an attacker-controlled manifest could potentially point these operations toward a malicious server to harvest credentials.
Audit Metadata