yolo
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill utilizes
sudoto perform system-level operations required for container management and security enforcement. - Evidence:
sudo systemctl start dockerinSKILL.mdto initiate the Docker service on Linux hosts. - Evidence:
postStartCommandindevcontainer.jsonexecutes the firewall script withsudoprivileges. - Evidence: The
Dockerfilemodifies/etc/sudoers.d/to grant the container user passwordlesssudoaccess specifically for the firewall initialization script. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The Docker configuration downloads and immediately executes a shell script from an external source.
- Evidence:
references/dockerfile.mdcontains aRUNcommand that fetcheszsh-in-docker.shfromgithub.com/deluan/zsh-in-dockerand pipes it tosh. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches software packages and network configuration data from various external sources.
- Evidence: Downloads the
git-deltabinary fromgithub.com/dandavison/deltaduring the Docker build process. - Evidence: The firewall script in
references/init-firewall.sh.mdfetches IP metadata fromapi.github.com/metato configure allowed network ranges. - [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses dynamic context markers to execute discovery commands when the skill is loaded by the agent.
- Evidence: Uses
!pwd, `!`ls -la .devcontainer/devcontainer.json ..., and!docker info ...`` inSKILL.mdto assess the local environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an environment designed for autonomous operation with suppressed permissions, which increases the impact if the agent processes malicious instructions in project files.
- Ingestion points: The entire project directory is mounted to
/workspaceinside the container. - Boundary markers: None present; the skill encourages the use of
--dangerously-skip-permissionswhich bypasses internal LLM safety prompts for tool use. - Capability inventory: The agent gains full command execution and file system access within the container, along with persistent storage via Docker volumes.
- Sanitization: No data sanitization is performed; however, the skill implements a network firewall (default-deny) to mitigate the risk of data exfiltration.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Performs file system operations to manage vendor-specific plugins.
- Evidence: Copies files from
node_modules/@jgamaraalv/ts-dev-kit/to the project's.claude/directory to ensure availability within the isolated container environment.
Audit Metadata