web-fetcher
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from the web and provides it to the agent.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via
scripts/fetch.py, which retrieves content from arbitrary URLs using services like Jina Reader and Raw HTML fetches. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not instruct the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions within the fetched content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has network access, file system write access (via the
-oflag inscripts/fetch.py), and the ability to execute theopenclicommand-line tool. - Sanitization: Absent. The fetched content is decoded and returned to the agent without any escaping, filtering, or validation.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Instructions in
SKILL.mdexplicitly command the agent to 'ALWAYS use this skill instead of the WebFetch tool', which is an attempt to override the agent's default tool selection logic. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends installing the
@jackwener/openclipackage and manually installing a browser extension (opencli-extension.zip) from an external GitHub repository (github.com/jackwener/opencli) to enable 'login-aware' fetching features. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fetch.pyexecutes theopenclibinary usingsubprocess.runto handle specific platform content (e.g., Reddit, Twitter, Zhihu). While the arguments are passed as a list to prevent shell injection, this remains a capability for executing external binaries with parameters derived from user input.
Audit Metadata