claude-to-im

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manages a background daemon process using platform-specific service managers to ensure persistence.
  • On macOS, it creates a launchd configuration file at ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.claude-to-im.bridge.plist to manage the lifecycle of the bridge process.
  • On Windows, the supervisor-windows.ps1 script provides functionality to install the daemon as a Windows Service using WinSW or NSSM.
  • In src/codex-provider.ts, the skill uses a Function constructor with a dynamic import statement to lazily load the optional @openai/codex-sdk dependency at runtime.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The scripts/doctor.sh diagnostic tool and the various platform adapters in src/adapters/ perform outbound network requests to official messaging platform APIs (including Telegram, Feishu, QQ, and DingTalk) to validate credentials and poll for incoming messages.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The bridge architecture creates a surface for indirect prompt injection as it retrieves untrusted data from messaging platforms and forwards it to the agent context.
  • Ingestion points: Incoming messages from messaging channels enter the agent's context through the polling logic defined in src/adapters/.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions observed in the code that would warn the model to ignore potential injection content within the IM messages.
  • Capability inventory: The skill's configuration in SKILL.md allows the agent to use highly privileged tools including Bash, Read, Write, and Edit.
  • Sanitization: While the skill implements log redaction for its own credentials, raw message text from IM platforms is passed to the AI model's query interface.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 1, 2026, 05:06 PM