baoyu-wechat-summary

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires disabling the security sandbox via dangerouslyDisableSandbox: true to execute shell commands using the wx binary and other utilities such as ls, jq, wc, and rm. This grants the agent broad access to the local environment and sensitive files.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to access and summarize sensitive data from the user's local WeChat directories (~/Library/Containers/com.tencent.xinWeChat/) and CLI configurations (~/.wx-cli/). While it does not include explicit exfiltration commands, the exposure of private chat history in a high-privilege context represents a significant data exposure risk.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on an external third-party dependency, wx-cli, which must be installed from a third-party GitHub repository (jackwener/wx-cli).\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted chat messages from WeChat groups. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where a malicious message could attempt to exploit the agent's high-privilege shell access.\n
  • Ingestion points: Chat history retrieved via wx history and parsed as JSON (SKILL.md Step 3).\n
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or system instructions defined to prevent the agent from interpreting message content as executable commands.\n
  • Capability inventory: Shell execution with sandbox disabled, and file system read/write access to the host environment (SKILL.md Workflow).\n
  • Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on message content to detect or filter potential prompt injection patterns.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 14, 2026, 03:33 AM