bibi
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's setup routine in
scripts/bibi-check.shand installation guide inreferences/installation.mdrecommend installing the CLI tool by piping a remote script from the vendor's domain directly to the shell usingcurl -fsSL https://bibigpt.co/install.sh | bash.- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several shell commands across its workflows to facilitate operations. This includes executing Python snippets for URL encoding (python3 -c 'import urllib.parse...'), managing clipboard content viapbcopyandxclipfor note export, and writing generated summaries directly to the local directory at~/Documents/bibigpt-notes/. It also includes a command to install the skill body into the local agent configuration.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill handles untrusted external data in the form of video transcripts, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Video subtitles are retrieved from the
api.bibigpt.coendpoint and processed by the agent in workflows such asworkflows/article-rewrite.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or specific instructions to the agent to disregard potential commands embedded within the fetched video content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands and write to the local file system, making it a high-impact target for successful injections.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved transcript text is described before it is integrated into prompt construction.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation suggests downloading and installing the
@alipay/agent-paymentpackage from NPM to support automated per-call payments in specific regions.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://bibigpt.co/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata