notebooklm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection because its core functionality involves fetching, indexing, and 'chatting' with untrusted external content from URLs, YouTube videos, PDFs, and other documents.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through the
notebooklm source addcommand and bulk ingestion scripts likescripts/nlm-bulk-add.sh. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are used when presenting content retrieved via
notebooklm askor generated reports to the agent. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to write to the filesystem via
notebooklm download, perform network operations via the API wrapper, and execute complex generation tasks. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the retrieved content is performed by the wrapper scripts before the data is passed to the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
notebooklm-pypackage from PyPI and uses Playwright to install the Chromium browser for authentication purposes. While these are necessary for the tool's functionality, they represent external dependencies. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill functions by executing various CLI commands under the
notebooklmnamespace. This includes potentially long-running operations like audio/video generation and research tasks. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill facilitates the storage of Google OAuth session cookies and authentication tokens in
~/.notebooklm/storage_state.json. The documentation correctly advises users to set restrictive permissions (chmod 600) on these files, but they remain sensitive local data.
Audit Metadata