proxy-networking
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill downloads and executes an installation script from an external, third-party source.
- Evidence: In
references/v2ray-agent.md, the workflow includes:wget -P /root -N --no-check-certificate "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mack-a/v2ray-agent/master/install.sh"; chmod 700 /root/install.sh; /root/install.sh. - Risk: The use of
--no-check-certificatedisables SSL certificate validation, making the download vulnerable to Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks. Executing unverified scripts from third-party repositories grants the script full control over the target host. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive privileged operations on remote systems as the root user.
- Evidence: Multiple reference files (e.g.,
references/config-patterns.md,references/preflight.md,references/topology-workflow.md) instruct the agent to usesshto execute commands such asiptables,sysctl, andsystemctl restarton remote VPS nodes. - Risk: This provides a significant attack surface where unintended or malicious commands could be executed with root privileges if the agent's instructions are manipulated.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches executable scripts and software from untrusted third-party domains.
- Source:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/mack-a/v2ray-agent/master/install.sh. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill handles and generates sensitive cryptographic keys and proxy configuration data.
- Evidence: The skill instructions involve extracting and managing
WireGuardprivate keys,Realityprivate keys, andVLESSUUIDs.references/vless-links.mddescribes the process of searching remote configuration files for these secrets. - Risk: Mishandling or exposure of these credentials during the automated deployment process could lead to the compromise of the proxy infrastructure and user traffic.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection through the automated processing of remote, untrusted configuration files.
- Ingestion Points: Remote configuration files such as
/root/realm.tomland Xray JSON files (referenced inreferences/preflight.mdandreferences/topology-workflow.md) are parsed by the agent. - Capability Inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including remote shell execution, system configuration modification, and service management across multiple hosts.
- Sanitization: The utility scripts provided (e.g.,
scripts/patch-realm-endpoint.py) use basic regex for modification and lack robust sanitization or validation of the input data, potentially allowing malicious instructions embedded in remote files to influence agent behavior.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata