requesting-code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
code-reviewer.mdtemplate instructs the subagent to execute shell commands using variables{BASE_SHA}and{HEAD_SHA}that are interpolated directly into a bash script block. - Evidence:
git diff --stat {BASE_SHA}..{HEAD_SHA}andgit diff {BASE_SHA}..{HEAD_SHA}incode-reviewer.md. - Risk: If these variables are manipulated (e.g., by a malicious external plan file providing a crafted string), the subagent may execute arbitrary shell commands.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted project data that could contain instructions designed to subvert the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The
{PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS}placeholder incode-reviewer.mdis designed to ingest text from external project files likedeployment-plan.md(as seen inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The prompt template lacks strict delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings, relying instead on simple markdown headers which provide poor isolation against adversarial text.
- Capability inventory: The subagent is explicitly granted the capability to execute shell commands (
git diff) and analyze code architecture and security. - Sanitization: The skill provides no mechanism for sanitizing, escaping, or validating the input data before it is placed into the prompt or used as shell arguments.
Audit Metadata