caveman-compress
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied natural language files and interpolates their content into a prompt for the Claude LLM. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions inside a project file could attempt to control the compression process or the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The target file content is read and processed in
scripts/compress.py. - Boundary markers: The prompt uses a
TEXT:header to delimit instructions from user data. - Capability inventory: The skill has file-write capabilities (
os.replace) and can execute theclaudeCLI viasubprocess. - Sanitization: The skill masks code blocks before sending text to the LLM to prevent modification of code, providing partial mitigation for injection vectors within code sections.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
claudeCLI tool using thesubprocessmodule to perform compression when the Anthropic SDK is not available or configured. - Evidence: Found in
scripts/compress.py, wheresubprocess.runcalls theclaudebinary. The execution uses a fixed list of arguments and passes user data via standard input rather than shell arguments. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill sends the content of the target file to Anthropic's API for processing.
- Evidence: The skill uses the Anthropic Python SDK or the
claudeCLI to transmit data. - Mitigation: The skill implements a robust sensitive path detection mechanism in
is_sensitive_pathto prevent the transmission of credentials, keys, and other sensitive system files by checking filenames, path components, and common secret tokens.
Audit Metadata