caveman-compress
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestrator script uses
subprocess.runto call the externalclaudeCLI as a fallback mechanism for users without a local environment variable for the API key. - Evidence: Found in
scripts/compress.py. The implementation uses fixed arguments["claude", "--print"]and avoids shell interpolation by passing data via standard input, which effectively mitigates command injection risks. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits the contents of files specified by the user to the Anthropic API. While this is the intended functionality, it involves crossing a data boundary.
- Evidence:
scripts/compress.pyimplements a robustis_sensitive_pathheuristic check. This filter proactively blocks the processing of sensitive files, such as environment variables (.env), SSH keys (id_rsa), and credentials, ensuring they are not sent to the external API. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill declares dependencies on external libraries for token counting and API communication.
- Evidence: The scripts reference the
anthropicandtiktokenPython packages. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted natural language files and interpolates their content into prompts for the LLM, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: File contents are read using
read_text()inscripts/compress.py. - Boundary markers: The prompt template in
build_compress_promptutilizes a "STRICT RULES" block to enforce behavior constraints on the model. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to overwrite local files and perform network requests to the Anthropic API.
- Sanitization: The tool performs post-processing via
strip_llm_wrapperand a dedicated validation suite (scripts/validate.py) that ensures technical elements like code blocks and URLs are preserved exactly as in the original.
Audit Metadata