caveman-compress

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied natural language files and interpolates their content into a prompt for the Claude LLM. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions inside a project file could attempt to control the compression process or the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The target file content is read and processed in scripts/compress.py.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt uses a TEXT: header to delimit instructions from user data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has file-write capabilities (os.replace) and can execute the claude CLI via subprocess.
  • Sanitization: The skill masks code blocks before sending text to the LLM to prevent modification of code, providing partial mitigation for injection vectors within code sections.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the claude CLI tool using the subprocess module to perform compression when the Anthropic SDK is not available or configured.
  • Evidence: Found in scripts/compress.py, where subprocess.run calls the claude binary. The execution uses a fixed list of arguments and passes user data via standard input rather than shell arguments.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill sends the content of the target file to Anthropic's API for processing.
  • Evidence: The skill uses the Anthropic Python SDK or the claude CLI to transmit data.
  • Mitigation: The skill implements a robust sensitive path detection mechanism in is_sensitive_path to prevent the transmission of credentials, keys, and other sensitive system files by checking filenames, path components, and common secret tokens.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 21, 2026, 11:56 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — caveman-compress