skills/kcchien/skills/xlsx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

xlsx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script recalc.py uses subprocess.run to call the soffice (LibreOffice) binary. Because the file path is passed as a command-line argument without sufficient validation, a maliciously named file (e.g., starting with a dash) could be used to perform argument injection attacks against the LibreOffice process.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: recalc.py performs dynamic code generation by creating a LibreOffice Basic macro file (Module1.xba) in the user's local configuration directory to automate formula calculation and then executes it via a system call.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, untrusted spreadsheet files, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: File loading via pandas.read_excel and openpyxl.load_workbook in SKILL.md examples and recalc.py.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to distinguish user-provided data from system instructions during spreadsheet processing.
  • Capability inventory: The agent possesses filesystem write access and the ability to execute shell commands via the recalc.py utility.
  • Sanitization: Input data from spreadsheets is not sanitized before being processed, which may lead to the execution of embedded malicious instructions if the agent interprets cell content as commands.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 16, 2026, 03:10 PM