xlsx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
recalc.pyusessubprocess.runto call thesoffice(LibreOffice) binary. Because the file path is passed as a command-line argument without sufficient validation, a maliciously named file (e.g., starting with a dash) could be used to perform argument injection attacks against the LibreOffice process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]:
recalc.pyperforms dynamic code generation by creating a LibreOffice Basic macro file (Module1.xba) in the user's local configuration directory to automate formula calculation and then executes it via a system call. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, untrusted spreadsheet files, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: File loading via
pandas.read_excelandopenpyxl.load_workbookinSKILL.mdexamples andrecalc.py. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to distinguish user-provided data from system instructions during spreadsheet processing.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses filesystem write access and the ability to execute shell commands via the
recalc.pyutility. - Sanitization: Input data from spreadsheets is not sanitized before being processed, which may lead to the execution of embedded malicious instructions if the agent interprets cell content as commands.
Audit Metadata