cluster-agent-swarm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes a significant surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from cluster logs, events, and alerts. Mitigation strategies are explicitly documented and implemented.
- Ingestion points:
skills/observability/scripts/log-search.sh(fetches pod logs) andalert-triage.sh(fetches cluster events and Prometheus alerts). - Boundary markers: The skill uses a
_sanitized: truemarker in its JSON output to help LLM agents distinguish processed data. - Capability inventory: The swarm has the power to execute arbitrary shell commands, manage Kubernetes resources (including deletions), and communicate with external APIs (PagerDuty, Slack).
- Sanitization: String fields are truncated to 500 characters and outputs are wrapped in a sanitization marker defined in
shared/lib/preflight.sh. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several scripts, such as
skills/observability/scripts/log-search.shandmetric-query.sh, utilize theevalcommand to assemble and executecurlrequests. This is used to dynamically inject authentication headers but presents a risk if inputs like namespace or app names are not strictly controlled. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
skills/security/scripts/cis-benchmark.shutility deploys a Kubernetes Job with high privileges, includinghostPID: trueand host system path mounts (/etc/kubernetes,/var/lib/etcd). This level of access is necessary for the tool's primary purpose of cluster security auditing. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process relies on
npx skills addfrom a third-party GitHub repository. The author provides extensive documentation inSECURITY.mdandOPERATIONAL_RISKS.mdregarding the supply chain risks and mandates pinning to specific commit hashes for production use.
Audit Metadata