codex-orchestrator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 24, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The bridge script
scripts/codex-bridge.mjsimplements a--context-cmdargument that is passed directly toexecSync, allowing the execution of arbitrary shell commands on the host. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation in
SKILL.mdandreferences/protocol-reference.mdexplicitly recommends bypassing safety controls using flags like--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxand settingapproval_policytoneverorsandbox_modetodanger-full-access. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
--context-cmdfeature captures command output and injects it into the LLM prompt, providing a mechanism to harvest and transmit sensitive local data to external model providers. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install the
@openai/codexpackage globally vianpm. While from a well-known organization, global package installation requires elevated permissions and introduces external code. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The bridge script facilitates the execution of shell commands and interaction with the Codex CLI, which is designed to generate and execute code autonomously.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface because it processes output from the Codex model and provides shell execution capabilities. * Ingestion points:
scripts/codex-bridge.mjsreads JSON output from the Codex CLI. * Boundary markers: Absent. * Capability inventory:execSyncandspawninscripts/codex-bridge.mjs. * Sanitization: Absent; uses a trivial regex blocklist for command names which is easily bypassed.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
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