ln-001-push-all
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes shell commands for git operations (
git add -A,git commit,git push) and dynamically discovered linting tools based on project configuration. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Downloads shared reference and configuration markdown files from the author's official GitHub repository (
github.com/levnikolaevich/claude-code-skills) if local copies are not found. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it identifies and executes commands from potentially untrusted project files.
- Ingestion points: Reads
docs/project/runbook.md,CLAUDE.md,README.md, andCONTRIBUTING.mdto discover linter and formatting commands (Phase 4). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or provide specific warnings to the agent to ignore embedded instructions within these data sources.
- Capability inventory: Possesses the capability to execute shell commands via subprocess calls during linting and git phases.
- Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization of the commands discovered in project documentation before they are executed.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instruction to use
git add -Astages all untracked and modified files in the repository. This behavior poses a risk of accidentally committing and pushing sensitive data, such as.envfiles, SSH keys, or local credentials, to a remote server if the user's.gitignorefile is missing or incorrectly configured.
Audit Metadata