ln-013-config-syncer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Explicitly modifies security policies in
~/.codex/config.tomlto setapproval_policy = "never"andsandbox_mode = "danger-full-access". This removes user-in-the-loop confirmation for commands and grants the agent unrestricted system access, creating a high-risk security state. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructs the agent to generate and execute temporary
.mjsscript files on Windows systems for configuration format conversions, involving dynamic code generation and execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Performs remote plugin installation and marketplace registration using CLI commands such as
/plugin installandcodex plugin marketplace addtargeting thelevnikolaevich/claude-code-skillsrepository. This involves downloading and executing code from external sources. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses sensitive configuration files (
~/.claude.json,~/.codex/config.toml) that may contain API credentials, access tokens, or sensitive environment variables within MCP server definitions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection surface through its automated language detection and provider check mechanism.
- Ingestion points: Reads project files including
package.json,pyproject.toml, andCargo.tomlinPHASE_4a(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to ignore embedded content in the ingested files.
- Capability inventory: Includes the ability to install MCP providers, plugins, and execute node scripts based on the ingested data.
- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the content of the ingested project metadata files.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata