ln-013-config-syncer

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Explicitly modifies security policies in ~/.codex/config.toml to set approval_policy = "never" and sandbox_mode = "danger-full-access". This removes user-in-the-loop confirmation for commands and grants the agent unrestricted system access, creating a high-risk security state.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructs the agent to generate and execute temporary .mjs script files on Windows systems for configuration format conversions, involving dynamic code generation and execution.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Performs remote plugin installation and marketplace registration using CLI commands such as /plugin install and codex plugin marketplace add targeting the levnikolaevich/claude-code-skills repository. This involves downloading and executing code from external sources.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses sensitive configuration files (~/.claude.json, ~/.codex/config.toml) that may contain API credentials, access tokens, or sensitive environment variables within MCP server definitions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection surface through its automated language detection and provider check mechanism.
  • Ingestion points: Reads project files including package.json, pyproject.toml, and Cargo.toml in PHASE_4a (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to ignore embedded content in the ingested files.
  • Capability inventory: Includes the ability to install MCP providers, plugins, and execute node scripts based on the ingested data.
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the content of the ingested project metadata files.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 12, 2026, 06:29 AM