ln-110-project-docs-coordinator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions in Phase 1.1 (Auto-Discovery) explicitly direct the agent to access and extract data from sensitive system configuration files. Specifically, it scans
~/.ssh/configto gather SSH aliases, hostnames, and IP addresses for theSERVER_INVENTORYcontext key. It also extracts registry URLs and potentially sensitive data from.npmrcand.env.examplefiles. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. It implements a multi-step chain where untrusted data from the local environment is used to influence sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the scanning of project files (e.g.,
README.md,package.json,CODEOWNERS, and source code structures) during Phase 1.1. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks any boundary markers or instructions for sub-agents to ignore embedded directives within the gathered context.
- Capability inventory: The coordinator uses the
Agenttool to delegate tasks to five sub-workers (ln-111throughln-115), which have the capability to write files to the project directory and perform further processing. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the content extracted from project files before it is interpolated into the prompts for sub-agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands and MCP tools to gather project information and research best practices. This includes executing
git logto extract contributor information and usingmcp__Ref__ref_read_urlto fetch content from external websites during the research phase.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata