ln-510-quality-coordinator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
references/agents/agent_runner.mjsprovides a--verify-deadcommand-line argument that can terminate arbitrary processes on the host system usingtaskkill(Windows) orkill -9(Unix). This functionality allows the agent to stop any running application if it identifies or is provided with the Process ID (PID). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
references/agents/agent_registry.jsonfile configures theclaudeadvisor agent with the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag. This disables security confirmation prompts and human-in-the-loop oversight for the sub-agent's tool usage, effectively granting it autonomous control over the environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface. It reads project files and Story metadata in Phase 1 and 2, and interpolates this untrusted content into prompts for external advisors in
references/agents/prompt_templates/review_base.mdandreferences/agents/prompt_templates/iterative_refinement.mdwithout sanitization or boundary markers. - Ingestion points: Project files and Story metadata loaded during Phase 1 Discovery in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore" instructions are used around the interpolated artifact content in prompt templates.
- Capability inventory: The system can spawn arbitrary processes from the registry and terminate existing processes via
agent_runner.mjs. - Sanitization: No escaping or validation of the
{artifact_content}or{project_context}variables was observed.
Audit Metadata