mcp-installer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
npxto dynamically fetch and execute the@smithery/clipackage from the Smithery registry. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Employs shell commands including
npxandrg(ripgrep) for environment discovery and automated installation procedures. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: Gathers MCP server definitions and configuration objects from the agent's context in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to differentiate between trusted and potentially malicious server configurations provided in the prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write capabilities across multiple sensitive application directories and can execute arbitrary shell commands via
npx(SKILL.md, references/clients.md). - Sanitization: Includes a manual verification step for secrets (API keys, tokens) before proceeding, but lacks validation for the executable commands or arguments within the server definitions.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Programmatically generates JSON configuration files containing shell commands and arguments that are later executed by third-party clients (such as Claude Desktop or Cursor) during normal operation.
- [PERSISTENCE]: Modifies persistent application configuration files (e.g.,
claude_desktop_config.json,settings.json) to register new servers that are automatically launched by the host application.
Audit Metadata