ai-paper-reproduction
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration script executes shell commands parsed from external repository README files.
- Evidence: In
scripts/orchestrate_repro.py, themaybe_run_commandfunction usessubprocess.runto execute strings extracted from the target repository's README. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of third-party code as part of its AI paper reproduction workflow, including scripts from other parts of the skill that are not provided in the current context.
- Evidence: The workflow defined in
SKILL.mdand implemented inscripts/orchestrate_repro.pyis centered on running code from unverified AI repositories. Additionally, the orchestrator attempts to execute adjacent scripts (scan_repo.py,extract_commands.py, andwrite_outputs.py) whose contents are missing from the analysis package. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection via the ingestion of untrusted README content which influences system-level actions.
- Ingestion points: The repository's
README.mdfile is processed inscripts/orchestrate_repro.pyto select and run shell commands. - Boundary markers: The skill does not employ delimiters or security instructions to isolate untrusted content during parsing or execution.
- Capability inventory: The orchestration script has access to
subprocess.runfor system command execution and file system APIs. - Sanitization: While
shlex.splitis used for basic syntactic parsing, the skill performs no semantic validation or filtering of the commands extracted from the untrusted source.
Audit Metadata