cook
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) due to its core orchestration logic.
- Ingestion points: It processes user-provided strings and external files like
PLAN.md(documented inSKILL.md) to define agent tasks. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions or templates in the skill to use delimiters or protective guardrails when interpolating external content into prompts for sub-agents.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator can execute
gitcommands and trigger recursive agent actions across multiple code branches. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of interpolated content (such as
${lastMessage}inreferences/spec.md) is performed before task delegation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local shell commands for its primary orchestration logic.
- Evidence: Instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/spec.mddetail the use ofgit difffor automated reviews andgit worktreefor managing parallel execution flows for the 'race' or 'vs' operators. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references an external command-line interface for extended functionality.
- Evidence: The
README.mdandSKILL.mdsuggest the optional installation of the@let-it-cook/clipackage via NPM for standalone terminal or CI usage.
Audit Metadata