whatsapp-macos
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands via the
/usr/bin/openbinary inSources/WhatsAppMCP/main.swiftto launch the WhatsApp application. Additionally, thepackage.jsonfile includes apostinstallscript that executesswift build. These are legitimate uses of command execution for application lifecycle management and compilation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It retrieves untrusted data from incoming WhatsApp messages through the
handleReadMessagesandhandleGetActiveChatfunctions inSources/WhatsAppMCP/main.swift. The skill lacks boundary markers or sanitization logic to prevent embedded instructions in these messages from influencing the agent's behavior. Combined with the skill's capabilities (e.g.,handleSendMessage,handleNavigate, andhandleQuit), this creates a surface where a malicious message could attempt to manipulate agent actions. Sanitization is limited to thecleanUnicodefunction, which only removes non-printing control characters. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The build process fetches several external dependencies defined in
Package.swiftandPackage.resolved, including theMacosUseSDKfrom a third-party GitHub repository. These downloads are performed by the Swift Package Manager as part of the standard build and installation workflow.
Audit Metadata