immune
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill maintains a persistent memory of patterns and strategies that is automatically updated based on user-provided content, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is received via the
inputparameter and processed in the<content>block as defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill uses XML-style
<content>tags in the prompt dispatched to theimmune-scanagent, but it lacks explicit instructions to the agent to ignore or escape instructions embedded within the scanned content. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to persistent local storage (
immune_memory.jsonandcheatsheet_memory.json) in Step 3 and 3b, and subsequent executions read and inject this data back into the agent context in Step 0 and Step 2. - Sanitization: The skill does not perform sanitization or validation on the
new_threats_detectedornew_strategies_detectedfields generated by theimmune-scanagent before writing them to the memory files. A malicious input could trick the scanner into persisting prompt injection payloads that would then affect future agent operations. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/retrieve.pyutility performing task-conditioned retrieval dynamically modifies the Python module search path (sys.path) at runtime to import thetask_signaturemodule from a computed relative directory.
Audit Metadata