manuscript-review

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow defined in SKILL.md for Pass 12 explicitly directs the agent to compile LaTeX source files if a PDF version is not available. This instruction requires the agent to execute system shell commands and interact with local compilation tools.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Directing an agent to compile untrusted LaTeX source code poses a high risk of code execution. Maliciously crafted LaTeX documents can utilize the shell escape feature (e.g., the \write18 command) to execute arbitrary scripts, which could lead to a complete system compromise depending on the environment permissions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted manuscript data (PDF, DOCX, LaTeX, Markdown) and processes it through a complex multi-pass audit without implementing boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the manuscript content.
  • Ingestion points: User-uploaded manuscript files identified in Step 1 and processed throughout the 13 audit passes.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack defined delimiters or specific markers to isolate the manuscript text from the agent's internal instruction set.
  • Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to read/write files and execute system commands for the purpose of document compilation.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation of the manuscript content is performed prior to analysis or compilation.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 11, 2026, 10:49 AM